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NOTES
or ratified, and those violations which were violations only after a trial
on the merits. Can it plausibly be argued that a jury, looking back on a
given set of facts, is in a better position to ascertain whether there were
"reasonable grounds to believe" that a violation was in existence or
about to happen than a business man who had many years of experience
in the field? It is obvious that the answer must be in the negative; yet
that is what would happen if an objective test of liability were established
for corporate officials. If individuals are to be subjected to more rigorous
penal sanctions, it may be necessary for Congress to dearly specify what
are violations, and to adequately define what is meant by "price fixing,"
and the phrase "apportioning, allocating or dividing any product market,"
for example." It is not suggested that such violations should escape all
liability. The violators should be liable to compensate persons who have
been damaged, but to also impose criminal liability in those cases would
seem to be unjust.
It is to be hoped that in the future the penal sanctions will assume
their rightful place in the prevention and punishment of violations, and
the civil action will be relegated to its original purpose of compensating
those who have been injured by violations.

TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL OF FRANCHISES UNDER
THE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS FRANCHISE ACT
Automobile retail distribution through the use of franchise agreements has expanded greatly in the last fifty years.' This growth2 has
brought with it conflicts and tensions.' The bargaining strength of the
manufacturer 4 reached such proportions' that the franchise relationship
61.

S. 2253, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).

1. For a general discussion of dealer franchise agreements see Note, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 1010 (1950); DAVISSON, MARKETING CHANNELS FOR MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS 83,
104-106 (Clewett ed. 1954).

2. The emergence of the manufacturer as the dominant party in the franchise
relationship is discussed in HEwITT, AUTOmOBILE DEALER FRANCHISES (1956).

3. See Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956).
4. In 1954, the automobile industry turned out a total of 9,177,919 cars and trucks.
Its investment was 7-1/3 billion dollars. See generally Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.

1119 (1956).
5. In terms of total economic investment the difference between the manufacturing
industry and those engaged in distribution is not too great. In 1954, the total investment
of the 42,000 franchise dealers was about five billion dollars. The superior bargaining

position of the manufacturer is apparent when the assets of one manufacturer are compared with those of a single dealer. For example in 1955 General Motors had assets
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between the dealer and the manufacturer left the dealer without remedy
in the courts because of exculpatory clauses contained in the agreement.'
This situation induced Congress to enact7 the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act' which attempts to balance the power now weighted in favor
of manufacturers by allowing franchise dealers to recover compensatory
damages sustained by reason of the failure of the manufacturer to act in
good faith in complying with the terms of the franchise or in terminating
or not renewing franchises with his dealers.9
The Dealers Act is a supplement to the antitrust laws of the United
States.1" However, the rights and remedies of one bringing an action
under the act are contained in the act. As to those matters, the act stands
on its own." Thus, a plaintiff is not able to impose on the Dealers Act
the more advantageous provisions for extraterritorial service of process,
treble damages or recovery of attorney fees 2 contained in the Clayton
Act." But injunctive relief may be available to the plaintiff under a
court's general equity power to give injunctive relief to make more
effective a remedy provided by law.' 4
The type of franchise protected by the Dealers Act is a written contract or agreement.' 5 The bill passed by the Senate included not only the
written franchise or agreement, but also any "understanding or arrangement between any manufacturer and any automobile dealer." 16 The
purpose of the deletion of the words "understanding or arrangement"
in the Senate version, words which would apparently have been broad
enough to include oral franchise agreements within the scope of the act,
was to "safeguard against the possible inclusion of anticompetitive trade
of over six billion dollars while the average investment of each dealer was $118,000.
H.R. RiP. No. 2850, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956).
6. H.R. REP'. No. 2850, szupra note 5, at 4.
7. The bill was signed into law by President Eisenhower on Aug. 8, 1956.
8. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1958).
9. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1958).
10. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 2.
11. Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
12. Provisions for double damages and recovery of attorney fees were deleted
before final passage of the act. H.R. RE'. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 8.
13. Aside from provisions concerning extraterritorial service of process, attorney's
fees and treble damages, there are several other conflicting sections between the Clayton
Act and the Dealers Act: the statute of limitations is four years under the Clayton Act
and three years under the Dealers Act; the Clayton Act makes a distinction between
individuals and corporations in the matter of venue. Under the Clayton Act the venue
in the case of corporations is where an inhabitant is "found or transacts business."
Under the Dealers Act the venue in all cases is where the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent.
14. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2477 (3d Cir. Mar. 28, 1962).
15. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(b) (1958).
16. H.R. PEP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 7.
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arrangements between the manufacturer and dealer. . .

.,,"

While the Dealers Act appears to protect only dealers with written
franchises, two cases brought under the act indicate that protection of an
oral agreement is a possibility. In the first,"3 the plaintiff alleged that
he and the defendant's agent had entered into an oral agreement whereby
the plaintiff was appointed the defendant's franchised dealer. In opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit alleging that the defendant's agent accepted an order
for cars and had accepted the plaintiff's check as a deposit, after telling
the plaintiff that a written application for a franchise was only a formality. The motion for summary judgment was denied because there
was an issue of fact to be resolved: whether the agent had authority to
bind the defendant to an oral franchise agreement.
Also in Reliable Volkswagen Sales and Service Co. v. World Wide
Automobile Corp."9 a motion for summary judgment was denied, despite
the plaintiff's concession that he had no formally prepared and executed
written franchise agreement with the defendants. The court held that it
was an issue of fact whether or not there was a franchise relationship
between the parties. Certainly the Dealers Act more nearly serves its
purpose of protection of the dealer against actionable termination or nonrenewal by the manufacturer if it is construed to include oral contracts
or those that can be adduced through documentary evidence or through
the actions of the parties. It is not the paper itself which the act seeks
to protect; the object of protection is the dealer's relationship with the
manufacturer. Practically this relationship may exist whether the parties
have reduced their agreement to writing or not. The dealer may be
induced to spend money in equipping and maintaining his agency notwithstanding the lack of a formal document. The dealer's penalty for not
having a written franchise should not be a denial of a remedy under the
Dealers Act, but only the added burden of proving at trial the terms of
the agreement as well as a breach by the manufacturer.
In some cases the manufacturer should also be liable where a written
franchise has existed but has been terminated by the dealer in reliance
on the manufacturer's promise to find a suitable buyer. The idea of termination must originate with the manufacturer. Otherwise, there would
17. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 7.
18. Pepper Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 1959 Trade Cases
(E.D.N.Y. 1959).
19. 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.C.N.J. 1960).

1 69,442
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normally be no lack of "good faith"2 in terminating the franchise. 2
If the evidence shows the desire to terminate originated with the dealer,
a subsequent breach by the manufacturer of his promise to find a buyer
would not be actionable under the act because there would be nothing
which could be construed as "coercion and intimidation."22
The Dealers Act makes the automobile manufacturer" liable for his
own "coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation" and
that of agents or distributors subject to his control. 4 The definition of
"automobile manufacturer" 25 in the act also provides the dealer with a
remedy against a distributor who is "under the control of" the manufacturer. The "control" intended by the act is de facto subordination to
the wishes and interests of the automobile manufacturer, whether expressed in a written contractual form or in a course of dealing.2" While
the system of using retailers under franchise to distributors that are in
turn under franchise to the manufacturer does not exist extensively in
the distribution of domestic cars," it is used frequently with regard to
distribution of foreign cars in the United States. The definition of
"automobile manufacturer" thus allows the foreign car retailer to seek his
remedy against the resident distributor. 8 While the Dealers Act is not
intended to freeze present channels or methods of distribution, 2 the
act must be read:
with the obvious reflection that a simple device to perpetuate
the bargaining domination enjoyed by the manufacturer without
risk of legal recourse as contemplated by the Act would be to
multiply the intermediary agencies through which the will of the
manufacturer is expressed. So long as the economic conditions
giving rise to the inordinate bargaining power could be maintained with respect to subordinate and intermediary distributors,
20. The definition of "good faith" is found in 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §
122 1(e) (1958). It means the duty to act "in a fair and equitable manner towards
each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or
threats of coercion and intimidation from the other party."
21. Pinney & Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Calif. 1959).
22. Cf. Pierce Ford Sales Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1962).
23. The Senate bill included the words "or other automotive vehicles." This phrase
was stricken in order to limit the coverage of the act to the distribution of passenger
cars, trucks and station wagons. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5,at 7.
24. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 7.
25. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1958).
26. Barney Motor Sales v.Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.Calif. 1959).
27. The right to bring suit under the act is limited to dealers residing in the United
States or its territories.
28. Cf., Fiat Motor Co. v. Alabama Imported Cars, Inc. 1961 Trade Cases g 70,023
(D.C.Cir. 1961).
29. H.R. REP. No. 2850, stpra note 5, at 9.
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the power to exact any terms could itself be used to compel the
middle man to pass on the terms and conditions desired by the
manufacturer to the ultimate retailer."0
The effectiveness of the Dealers Act is dependent on the interpretation
given to the statutory definition of "good faith." 1 The definition is
somewhat vague. "Good faith" is defined in terms of the duty of the
manufacturer 2 to act in a fair and equitable manner toward the dealer in
performing, terminating and not renewing the franchise, so as to guarantee the dealer freedom from coercion, intimidation or threats thereof.
It is not the purpose of the act to protect the dealer who is not
providing the manufacturer with adequate representation." For example,
in Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp.,3" a manufacturer was allowed not to renew the franchise of a dealer who was
absent from his business a good deal of the time, who did not have a
suitable place for display of the manufacturer's automobiles and whose
sales for the year did not match the general increase of most other dealers
in the area. As stated by the court:
[A] manufacturer has the right to expect the dealer to provide a
suitable outlet for its products. If the dealer fails in this respect
he must suffer the consequence that the manufacturer will
prefer to channel his products through another more acceptable
outlet.3"
It appears that the manufacturer may use "coercion and intimidation"
without incurring liability where it is used in an effort to raise the representation that a dealer is giving to an adequate standard.36 In Leach v.
Ford Motor Co., 7 the manufacturer urged the dealer, whose sales for

several years had been running 20-30% below his assigued market potentials, to hire three additional sales personnel in an attempt to bolster
sales. The manufacturer advised the dealer that failure to cooperate
would possibly lead to termination of the dealership. The dealer refused
and his franchise was cancelled. The court held that the evidence as a
30. Supra note 26, at 175.
31. Defined supra note 20.
32. The statutory definition is so written as to place the duty of "good faith" on
both the manufacturer and the dealer, but as a practical matter it would seem unlikely
that the dealer could coerce or intimidate a manufacturer.

33. H.R. RE. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 9.

34. 169 F. Supp. 378 (D.C.N.j. 1959).
35. Supra note 34, at 383.
36. Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 128 (5th Cir. 1962); see
Gavin v. American Motors Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
37. 189 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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whole showed that the cancellation was essentially based on the dealer's
failure to provide adequate representation. However, even assuming that
the manufacturer couched his sales plan in coercive terms, it was not made
in a context of bad faith as required by the act. It was "a means of
assistance to a dealer, who had steadily fallen below reasonably expected
performance, and as a means of avoiding, rather than furthering, any
termination of its franchise.""
In both the Staten Island and the Leach cases, the manufacturer's
standards are used as the basis for determining whether or not the dealer
has provided adequate representation, e.g.:
[The dealer] cannot allow his business for which he is solely
responsible, to be conducted by persons who had not reached
majority, and then seek relief under the Act when the manufacturer decides that such conduct affords inadequate representation for his product. 9
There is nothing patently unfair in the assignment of a market potential
by a manufacturer as a measure of expected performance, but such
standards obviously cannot be unreasonable or coercive in themselves.
To determine whether his assigned market potentials are unfair, the
dealer, in a suit under the act, can submit interrogatories to the manufacturer directed to the latter's dealings with its other franchise dealers.4"
These interrogatories may be limited4' geographically42 by the court, as
well as to activities with dealers of size comparable to that of the plaintiff.4 3 However, in a recent case, Gavin v. American Motors Corp.,"
a dealer who could not meet newly imposed standards of adequate
representation was allowed to recover for the manufacturer's failure to
renew his franchise. The dealer had represented the defendant and its
predecessor companies for thirteen years. He was chief executive officer,
head salesman and repairman. When Hudson Nash automobiles were
replaced by the Rambler, the defendant corporation underwent an exten38. Supra note 37, at 354; accord, Woodward Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962); Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 30 U.S.L. WEI 2489 (W.D.
Pa. April 4, 1962).
39. Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp.
378, 383 (D.C.N.J. 1959).
40. Blenke Bros. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 189 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill.
1960).
41. Such information may in some circumstances fall within the client-attorney
privilege. Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1962 Trade Cases 1170,192 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
42. Within a radius of sixty miles in the Blenke case, 189 F. Supp. 420, 423 (N.D.
Ill.
1960).
43. Blenke, supra note 42.
44. 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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sive sales overhaul "which lifted the corporation from its lowest ebb of
obscurity to a position of great prominence and success in the automobile
industry."4 These new sales policies were designed to make the defendant
more competitive. The plaintiff tried to comply with the modernization
requirements but was unable to meet the technical and detailed directives
of the defendant."0
The court stated that substantial evidence appeared in the record
for the jury to conclude "that the plaintiff dealer acted in good faith or
in the best of faith to comply with all directives issued to him and
that, as a corollary thereto, plaintiff did not act in bad faith justifying
termination of his franchise."4 The court said further that the inference
to be drawn from the evidence was that the defendant for personal reasons
did not desire a small dealer to represent it and:
in the stampede for success defendant intimidated and coerced
the plaintiff into complying with its then newly formulated
directives while, had the defendant applied a persuasive and
understanding approach to the problems of the plaintiff, he
undoubtedly would still remain as a representative of the defendant company.4"
The decision in the Gavin case does not alter the general right of the
manufacturer to terminate or not renew the franchise of an inefficient
dealer or to use methods which might otherwise be interpreted as coercion
or intimidation to raise standards of representation. Rather the case
appears to hold that when radically new market potentials and sales
methods are to be imposed, a manufacturer must allow the dealer a reasonable opportunity to meet the manufacturer's demands and to revamp his
practices. Certainly some chance to meet the new directives should be
allowed, but the manufacturer, seeking to alter its business practices in
an effort to be more competitive should not be barred too long from
terminating or not renewing the franchise of a dealer not able to cope with
a modernized system of distribution.
Assuming that the Dealers Act does not disturb the manufacturer's
general right to terminate or not renew when the dealer has not provided
adequate representation, how does the act otherwise limit this right? The
act gives the dealer a remedy that for the most part was closed to him
45.
46.
47.
48.

Supra note 44, at 671.
Ibid.
Supra note 44, at 671-672.
Supra note 44, at 672.
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when he sued for breach of contract at common law.4" Defenses such as
lack of mutuality are disposed of."0 But is the requirement of "good
faith"" broad enough to include termination by the manufacturer of
an existing franchise for purely personal reasons, i.e., where nothing that
could be construed as coercion or intimidation passed between manufacturer and dealer? The implication from the cases concerned with
"adequate representation" is that the manufacturer, despite clauses to
the contrary in the franchise agreement, can terminate the relationship
only for cause. The inability of the manufacturer to effect a termination
without cause of an existing franchise without incurring liability does
not seem too burdensome. A mutually satisfactory relationship, one in
which the dealer is providing adequate representation, is normally in the
manufacturer's best interest. However, this possible "wedding" of the
manufacturer to his dealer for the term of his franchise has a more important aspect because the "good faith" requirement extends to nonrenewal of the franchise, as well.
If "good faith" comes to mean that the manufacturer cannot refuse
to renew a franchise unless he can show cause, the practical effect will
be to show special consideration to existing dealers and to freeze the
inefficient dealer into the system of distribution.5 2
However, the meaning of "good faith" seems to change whether one
is speaking of it in relation to the manufacturer's termination of an
existing franchise or his failure to renew an expired franchise. As
stated, the Dealers Act is a supplement to the antitrust laws. This relationship appears to be important in determining the extent of the manufacturer's right to renew a franchise. In the Staten Island 3 case, after
affirming the right of a manufacturer to terminate or not renew the
franchise of a dealer failing to give adequate representation, the court
said:
Indeed, in cases brought under the Federal Anti-trust Laws, of
which the Act is a supplement . . . the manufacturer does not
violate the Sherman Act . . . when he cuts off the franchise of

a dealer who is admittedly doing a good business of selling the
manufacturer's autos (Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355
49. See generally H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 2-7; HEwiTT, supra note
2; FTC, Report on Motor Vehicle Industry, H.R. Doc. No. 468, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.

(1939).
50. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 9-10.
51. Defined supra note 20.
52. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 5, at 11-12.
53. 169 F. Supp. 378 (D.C. N.J. 1959).
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U.S. 822; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F.
Supp. 899 (Md. 1956), affm'd 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. den. 355 U.S. 823 (1957)). In this connection the Act
(15 U.S.C.A. § 1224) further provides that "no provision of
this chapter shall repeal, modify, or supercede, directly or indirectly, any provision of the anti-trust laws of the United
States."'
Unilateral refusals to deal generally are not violative of antitrust
provisions. Where there is no purpose to create a monopoly, the antitrust laws do not restrict the right of a manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private enterprise to choose the parties with whom he will deal. "
The manufacturer may not go beyond the exercise of this right, and by
contracts or combinations express or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct
the free and natural flow of commerce." Broadly stated, this right to
refuse to deal is as follows:
Before the Sherman Act it was the law that a trader might reject
the offer of a proposing buyer for any reason that appealed to
him; it might be because he did not like the other's business
methods, or because he had some personal differences with him,
political, racial, or social. That was purely his own affair, with
which nobody else had any concern. Neither the Sherman Act,
nor any decision of the Supreme Court construing the same,
nor the Clayton Act, has changed the law in this particular.
We have not reached the stage where the selection of a trader's
customers is made for him by the government."
The Dealers Act has imposed on this right to refuse to deal an obligation of "good faith." When the manufacturer bases his refusal to renew
on the dealer's unwillingness to accept new franchise terms, such as provisions providing for the dealer to handle exclusively the manufacturer's
products, the dealer need not show that the refusal to deal (renew) was
part of a conspiracy or scheme to monopolize. It is not necessary to
54. Supra note 53, at 383-84.
55. U.S. v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300-07 (1919). See generally, Turner, Definition of
Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75

HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962); Note, 7 How. LJ. 179 (1961); Note, 11 MERCER L. REv. 368
(1960); Note, 12 W. PRs. L. REv. 759 (1961).
56. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922). See U.S. v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 365 U.S. 125 (1960). This case indicates that a manufacturer may
use the right to refuse to deal as a means of "policing" a distribution system; but that no
joint action or understanding between manufacturer and distributor is permissible.
57. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 F. 46, 49
(2d Cir. 1915).
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prove a violation of the antitrust provisions before recovering under
the Dealers Act. In reality in such a situation the dealer would be precluded from suing under section 3 of the Clayton Act"8 by the very fact
that no franchise exists between the manufacturer and the dealer. Section
3 prohibits sales or contracts for sale of goods on the condition, agreement
or understanding that the purchaser will not deal in the goods of a
competitor, where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. Thus, there must be a sale or contract for
sale of goods imposing the exclusive arrangements, as well as proof that
the effect of the agreement may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.
The existence of these refusals to deal has been used by the government as evidence in prosecutions of section 3 violations. In Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC,5" the manufacturer notified its dealers that their
franchises would be forfeited unless they agreed to handle only Carter
products. The manufacturer was found guilty of violation of section 3,
as well as section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.6" While none
of the franchises of the dealers who agreed not to handle competitive lines
contained any such explicit provisions, the court found that under the
circumstances the exclusive dealing condition was as effective as if
written into the contract.6 "
As for the right of the dealer himself to bring suit for violation of
the antitrust laws, " as yet there seems to have been no recovery for section
3 violations by dealers who refused to deal:
Neither in terms nor inferentiall*r does the statute prohibit a unilateral refusal to deal. Its condemnations are directed against
executed transactions of lease, sale or contract for sale containing the forbidden condition, agreement or understanding.
58. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease or make
a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . or fix a price charged therefor, or
discount therefrom, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement,
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in
the goods . . . of a competitor . . . of the seller, where the effect of such

lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce.
59. 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
60. 38 Stat. 719 (1925), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
61. In U.S. v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp., 856 (D.C. Minn. 1951) the defendant
coerced some of its 3,738 dealers to handle exclusively the Case line of machinery. The
evidence showed no appreciable segment of commerce was affected; hence, no violation
of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts was found.
62. Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows private suits for treble damages for parties
injured by reason of the antitrust violation. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).

NOTES
[M]ere refusal by a manufacturer to deal with a retailer who
will not confine his dealing to the goods of the manufacturer
does not run afoul of the section.63
The Dealers Act, however, provides a remedy for the automobile
dealers treated in this manner. The dealer need only show that the refusal
to renew involved the use of coercion or intimidation. Any antitrust
violation by the manufacturer is secondary when the dealer sues under
the act. It is not an element of the dealers cause of action.
For example, in United States v. Chrysler Corp.,"4 the manufacturer
was accused by the government of violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act by applying illegal pressure against
his dealers who also sell cars made by a competitor, forcing the dealers to
give up franchises for other cars. The complaint asserted that a "substantial number" of dealers entered into unlawful agreements to cease
selling competing cars after the manufacturer's representatives on
"numerous occasions" told the dealers they could not sell the manufacturer's cars unless they stopped selling the others.
In a situation such as is presented by the Chrysler case, the remedy
of the dealer who refused to accept renewal of his franchise on the terms
offered by the manufacturer does not depend on the government proving
its case. The only requirement of proof is the nature of the refusal to
deal, i.e., that it was coercive. But in the instance where the franchise
is allowed to expire of its own terms without any threats or coercion,
the result should remain the same as before the passage of the act. The
manufacturer should be held to the terms of his agreement with his
dealer, but he should be left free to exercise his own business judgment
on the question of whether or not to renew the agreement.
In this view the result in the PackardMotor Co.65 and the Schwing0
7 case, would be the
cases, cited in the Staten Island"
same if brought under
8
the Dealers Act. In the Packard case the plaintiff was one of three
Packard dealers in Baltimore, operating under a one-year franchise. In
1953, Zell, the largest of the Baltimore dealers, requested an exclusive
franchise. The manufacturer agreed and told the plaintiff it would not
renew his franchise. Plaintiff protested and threatened suit; whereupon
the manufacturer then promised a one-year renewal but no more. The
63.

McElhenny Co., Inc. v. Western Auto Supply, 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
TRADE REG. REP. 1 45,061 (Case 1598) (N.D. Ind. April 7, 1961).
65. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
66. 138 F. Supp. 899 (D.C. Md. 1956).
67. See quote at note 54, supra.
68. Fulda A. Dissent, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 367, 369 (1957) ; contra, Note, 5 How.

64. 5 CCH

L.J. 229 (1959).
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dealer then quit his business and sued for alleged antitrust violations.
The facts of the Schwing case are similar. The manufacturer refused to renew the plaintiff's franchise. Instead, he created an exclusive
agency in another dealer. In both cases, the court denied relief holding
that a refusal to deal becomes illegal only when it produces an unreasonable restraint of trade or a monopoly forbidden by antitrust laws. Since in
neither case was coercion or intimidation involved, the manufacturer's
refusal to deal would not be in violation of the Dealers Act.
The Schwing and Packard cases are to be contrasted with the situation illustrated by the Chrysler and numerous other cases.69 In the latter
cases the manufacturer has refused to deal because the dealer will not
agree to new terms.7" Conditioning renewal on the dealer's acceptance of
new franchise provisions raises a question of reasonableness. Not every
change at which the dealer balks should create liability in the manufacturer. If it did, the manufacturer would be faced with the alternative
of either not altering the franchise which had existed and retaining the
present dealer or letting the franchise expire of its own terms and seeking
a new dealer-and, perhaps, a lawsuit.
Thus it would seem that the general right of the manufacturer to deal
with whom he pleases has not been modified in principle by the Dealers
Act, except to the extent that a refusal to deal on the part of the manufacturer may be actionable where it is the result of a dealer's unwillingness
to be coerced into accepting new franchise provisions or new restrictions
on his economic freedom which are unreasonable or illegal.
CONCLUSION

The Dealers Act gives the franchise dealer a limited remedy in the
form of damages, but only compensatory damages may be recovered.
In some instances a court using its inherent equity power may grant an
injunction to render the remedy provided by the act more effective.
There is some indication that oral franchises, as well as written, may be
protected.
Inefficient dealers are not benefited under the act. A manufacturer
may terminate or not renew a franchise for lack of adequate representa69.

McElhenny Co., Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., supra note 63; Hunter

Douglas Corp. v. Lando Products, 215 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1954); Leo J. Meyberg Co.
v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952). Cf. Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268
(5th Cir. 1954).
70. Such a refusal may be for business reasons. In Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip,
supra note 69, the evidence showed that the manufacturer had asked the plaintiff on
threat of non-renewal to drop other lines of competing products because the plaintiff
was too dispersed and was not giving the manufacturer adequate representation. When
the plaintiff refused to comply, his franchise was not renewed.

NOTES
tion based upon his own standards. The reasonableness of these standards, including the question of whether or not the dealer has had a
reasonable time within which to comply, is a question of fact, just as is
the question of whether or not the dealer has conformed to the standards.
The manufacturer may use threats of termination or non-renewal in an
effort to force the dealer to meet fair market standards. Such action is
not in "bad faith" because the manufacturer, by foregoing his immediate
right to terminate or not renew, is merely giving the dealer another
opportunity to perform his agreement.
A manufacturer cannot escape the force of the act as it pertains to
cancellation of a franchise by simply refusing to deal further with the
dealer who is otherwise giving adequate representation. To this extent,
the act in effect replaces any exculpatory clauses in the franchise which
allow the manufacturer to cancel without cause before the term of the
franchise has run.
However, the act should not be so broadly read as to force the
manufacturer by threat of an adverse judgment to renew the franchise
of an efficient dealer. The dealer should have the burden of proving
that the refusal to deal involved the use of coercion and intimidation or
threats thereof. It is unlikely that Congress intended the act to make any
dealer the permanent representative of an automobile manufacturer.
The strong principle in this country of the right of a manufacturer to
refuse to deal generally appears to outweigh the possibility that such
a permanent arrangement was intended. In any event, the manufacturer
should be permitted to vary the number and concentration of his dealers
through the exercise of his business judgment.
An interpretation of the act which would permit non-renewal in
only very limited instances, e.g., where the dealer had not provided adequate representation, would place the federal courts in the unhappy position of being responsible for devising and enforcing the system of distribution in the automobile industry. It is not evident from the legislative
history of the act that Congress felt it was considering such a profound
change in the law governing the relationship between an automobile
manufacturer and his dealer.
Implicit in an analysis of the Dealer Act as allowing the manufacturer little freedom to cancel an existing franchise, but giving him
much broader freedom not to renew a franchise, is the necessity of a
franchise for a definite term. During a substantial period before the
congressional hearings leading to the passage of the act, indefinite term
franchises were common. Since that time this type of franchise has been
replaced by the franchise for a definite term of one or five years. The
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impact of the act is such that the manufacturer is not likely to revert
to the use of indefinite term franchises. The prohibition against cancelling a franchise without cause would have the same effect on an indefinite
term franchise as a broad prohibition against not renewing a franchise
would have on a franchise for a definite term. Thus, it is perhaps
possible for manufacturers to escape the force of the act by using only
short term franchises.

THE EFFECT OF AN ADJUDICATED COMPROMISE OF A WILL
CONTEST OR CONTROVERSY UPON THE RIGHT TO
DISPOSE OF PROPERTY BY WILL
It has been stated that "no rule regarding wills is more settled than
the General Rule that the testator's intent if it is not unlawful must
prevail."' Testamentary intent is "unlawful," and thus a limitation is
imposed upon the right to dispose of property by will, if, for example,
it contravenes public policy, violates the rule against perpetuities or
attempts to devise a fee simple or absolute estate with unreasonable restraints imposed upon its sale or alienation.2 It would seem that enforcement of agreements compromising will contests and controversies is an
additional limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will. the
purpose of this -note is to examine the common law rule concerning
agreements compromising will contests and controversies,3 the rationale
upon which judicial enforcement or recognition of these agreements is
based and the effect upon the common law rule of adjudicated compromise of controversies statutes enacted by eight states and included in the
Model Probate Code.4
COMPRO-MISES AT COMMON LAW

Generally, judicial enforcement or recognition of compromise agree1. Cannistra Estate, 384 Pa. 605, 607, 121 A.2d 157, 158 (1956).

2. Ibid.
3. For extensive listings and discussion of cases enforcing or recognizing agreements compromising will contests and controversies see generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d
1319 (1955); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 468 (1935).
4. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-301 to 303 (Burns 1953); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 204
§§ 14-18 (1955); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (115)-(118) (1943); N.J. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3A: 14-1
enumerated claims
§ 19; PA. STAT.
§§ 33-7-12 to -17

to -9
or to
ANN.
(1956)

(1953) (this statute permits a fiduciary to compromise certain
submit them for judicial approval); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW
tit. 20 §§ 320.513, 320.945 (1950) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 318.31 (1958); MODEL PRO3ATE CODE

§§ 93-95 (Simes 1946). See Annot, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319, 1372-1379 (1955)
discussion of several of these enactments.

for a short

